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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
profit by the proof of this fact, it must first be alleged in the pleadings. 7 The
allegations and the proof twust be consistent. Only the issues raised by the
pleadings can be proved, and there can be no recovery upon a cause of action,
no matter how worthy. where the proof varies in substance from that which
is pleaded by the plaintiff.
To infer the absent fact "necessarily or fairly" from this plaintiff's declara-
tion required an extremely liberal interpretation by the court. There is ob-
viously some doubt as to whether the dangerous effect of the lacquer as a
matter of fact, in and of itself, need be alleged. The court admitted that the
declaration tinder consideration was not exact and positive in its averments. 9
Considering the well-established principle that in case of doubt, ambiguity or
uncertainty, the cpnstruction of a pleading will be adopted which is most un-
favorable to the pleader,' o it seems that, in construing this declaration most
strongly against the plaintiff, the opposite result should have been reached.
The court's apparent application of equitable principles to the construction
of a pleading at law, in a state in which the courts of law and equity are
separate, is a deviation which, if extended, will impair the utility of the de-
murrer to a faulty declaration.
TAXATION-CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS-GIFT OR INCOME
Respondent. holder of a 99-year lease on real property, borrowed $90,000
from a bank, executing in return bonds secured by a trust deed mortgaging
to the bank the leasehold. The trustee bank closed and a bondholders' corn-
mittee was formed. Respondent subsequently purchased the bonds for an
amount less than their face value. Purchases were effected b (I ) direct
negotiation with individual bondholders; (2) indirect negotiation through
brokers and the bondholders' committee. Respondent was solvent both before
and after the acquisition of the bonds. Each seller of bonds knew that lie was
selling to respondent-maker and at a price less than the face value. Respondent
failed to include in his gross income for federal income tax purposes the differ-
ence between the purchase prices paid by hin and the face value. The Coninis-
7. Pensacola Electric Terminal Ry. v. Haussnia,, 51 Fla. 286, 40 So. 196 (1906)
Jacksonville T. & K. W. Ry. v. Neff, 28 Fla. 373, 9 So. 653 (1891) (instructions of the
court must be confined to the issues made by the pleading).
8. Florida Fire & Casualty Ins. Co, v. Hart, 73 Fla. 970, 75 So. 528 (1917) ; ee
Hollingsworth v. Norris, 77 Fla. 498, 0, 81 So. 782, 783 (1919) ; Ingram-Dekle Lumber
Co. v. Geiger, 71 Fla. 390, 418, 71 So. 552, 560 (1916). It appears, however, that the de-
fect of variance between pleading and proof will usually be cured by a verdict. FLA.
STAT. § 54.26 (1941).
9. See note 1 suprn.
10. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 85 F.2d 886 (C.C.A. 5th
1936) ; State ex rel. Dillman v. Tedder, Judge, 123 Fla. 188, 166 So. 590 (1936); see
Hernandez v. Pensacola, 141 Fla. 441, 445, 193 So. 555, 557 (1940) ; Woodcock v. Wilcox,
98 Fla. 14, 18, 122 So. 789, 790 (1929).
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sioner added this difference to respondent's gross income. Held, reversing tile
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, that since respondent derived
financial gain, both through direct and indirect purchases of his obligations at
a discount, such gain was in no sense the result of a gift and was therefore
properly includible in his tax return as income. Connissioner of Internal Reze-
nue v. Jacobson, 69 Sup. Ct. 358 (1949).
The Court had previously distinguished between reduction of the debtor's
indebtedness through direct negotiation with the creditor 1 and reduction
through indirect negotiation by neans of purchases in the open market at less
than face value,2 holding that the former transaction was akin to a gift while
the latter involved receipt of income. The Tax Court maintained this distinction
in the principal case.3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that excesses resulting from both direct and indirect transactions were
gifts to respondent because of sellers' knowledge that the bonds were being
bought by or for him. 4
The instant case presents the problen of whether a gain realized in the
reduction of one's indebtedness is taxable as income 4f or exempt as a gift. 6
For a better understanding of this aspect of the problem (is it income?) the
question of the repurchasing debtor's solvency,6 mode of repurchase (direct or
indirect negotiations),7 and the respective motives 8 of the parties to the trans-
action in cancelling the balance of the indebtedness should be considered.
Before the problem of gift versus income arose it was questioned whether
such reduction of indebtedness at less than face value was taxable income even
though the gain admittedly did not result front a gift on the part of the creditor.
It was soon settled, however, that a person may derive income not only by
receiving a payment, but by having an indebtedness discharged. In short,
income may be realized throtgh) a decrease in liabilities 9 as well as through
1. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
2. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
3. 6 T. C. 1048 (1946). See also Fifth Avenue-14th St. Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d
453 (C, C. A. 2d 1945).
4. 164 F.2d 594 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
4a. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code reads as follows: "Gross income"
includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for per-
sonal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations,
trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property, also from interest,
rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit,
or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever."
5. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
6. Dallas T. & T. Wardhouse Co. v. Conni'r, 70 F.2d 95 (C. C. A. 5th 1934) (where
the court held that when an insolvent debtor conveyed property to his creditors in full or
partial satisfaction of his obligations, the difference realized was not taxable gain since he
was still insolvent after the gain).
7. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jacobson. supra.
8. Ibid.
9. -Fee Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929) (The Court held
that where the corporation paid employee's income tax, that amount paid as income tax
was additional income to the employee since it discharged his liability to pay the tax).
Accord, United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 279 U.S. 732 (1929).
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an increase in assets. In Helveriny v. Brnufn " the Court stated that while
every economic gain toes not result in taxable income, yet such income may
be realized by ". . . payment of the taxpayer's indebtedness, relief from a
liability or other profit realized from the completion of a transaction." it Gains
from such transactions may be taxable as income inasmuch as they represent
an increase in the taxpayer's net worth, due to the decrease in his liabilities
without a corresponding decrease in his assets. In United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co."' the Court held that a corporation realized taxable income by
the repurchase of its own bonds at a discount in the open market.13 The
doctrine announced in the Kirby case was universally followed 14 until a new
aspect of the problem was presented in the American Dental case,16 where the
taxpayer was heavily indebted under notes and a lease agreement. The creditors
cancelled the notes and the lessor offered and did cancel the indebtedness under
the lease when paid $7500, less than the full amount owed. '[he Commissioner
of Internal Revenue sought to tax the forgiven balance due on the cancelled
notes plus the sum realized by cancellation of the lease. The Court upheld the
taxpayer's contention that this transaction was in the nature of a gift and
therefore exempt as taxable income.1 0 The doctrine was announced that, "The
release of interest or the complete satisfaction of an indebtedness by partial
payment by the voluntary act of the creditor is more akin to a reduction of
sale price, than to a financial betterment through the purchase by a debtor
of the bonds in an arms-length transaction.""7 (italics ours)
The Court in the instant case attempts to distinguish its holding from
that in the American Dental case, but it is submitted that the distinction is
erroneously conceived. Where the creditor deals directly with the original
10. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
11. Id. at 469.
12. 284 U.S. I (1931). Notes, 32 COL, L. REv. 137 (1932); 45 HAv. L. Rev. 744
(1932). The doctrine of the Kirby case was extended in Helvering v. American Chicle
Co., 291 U.S. 426 (1934), where the taxpayer assumed bond obligations in connection with
the purchase of property. Since the bonds were purchased at a discount, it was contended
by the taxpayer that this constituted a reduction of the purchase price of the property.
Held, that the discount was taxable income. See also Commissioner v. Coastwise Trans-
portation Corp., 71 F.2d 104 (C. C. A. 1st 1934).
13. The bonds in question were purchased at less than par. See also Bowers v. Ker-
baugh Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), where taxpayer, a corporation, had borrowed
money repayable in German marks or their equivalent. When time came for repayment,
the marks had fallen in value, resulting in a gain to the taxpayer. But since the transaction
as a whole resulted in a loss (the taxpayer-corporation had failed) the Court denied the
Commissioner's claim that the gain constituted taxable income. And see Burnet v. San-
ford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 (1930).
14. See Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) ; Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue v. Montana, Wyoming & Southern R.R., 31 H. T. A. 62 (1935).
15. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
16. Section 22(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, involved in both the principal case
and the American Dental case, reads as follows: Exclusions from gross income.-The
following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation
under this title: (3) Gifts, bequests, and devises-The value of property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or inheritance ... "
17. Helvering v. American Dental Co., supra at 330.
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debtor, and the debt due is discharged for less than its face amount, the
courts have held that the reduction is not income.' 8 Such direct dealing would
seem to raise a strong implication that the creditor intended to forgive the
balance of the debt rather than sell it in an "arms-length" transaction. This
view of the facts in the instant case was taken by Mr. Justice Reed and Mr.
Justice Douglas, who dissented ("We held in the American Dental case that
the 'receipt of financial advantages gratuitously' was a gift .... Congress has
made no change in the law since that time ... .").19
It is submitted that the majority, in reaching the result in the instant case
that gain to the taxpayer through direct negotiations with his creditors consti-
tuted taxable income, not only overrules sub silentio the American Dental
case, but in addition further complicates and confuses this already complicated
question.
TAXATION - FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - REVERTER BY OPERATION OF
LAW - EXTENSION OF HALLOCK DOCTRINE
In 1920, the decedent created a trust of certain stock and named himself
and another as trustees. Under the provisions of the trust agreement the trust
income was to be distributed among the decedent's three children so long as
he lived and if they did not survive him, to any of their surviving children.
Upon his death the principal of the trust was to be divided among the same
beneficiaries and in the same manner as the income. The trust agreement was
silent as to what disposition was to be made of the principal of the trust and
any income which might have accumulated thereon in the event the decedent
were to survive all his children and grandchildren. At the decedent's death
in 1940 the Commissioner included the entire value of the trust, together with
the accumulated income in the decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court reversed
the Commissioner but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the finding of the Commissioner. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, that the trust property was properly included in the decedent's gross
estate under Section 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which section
requires the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate the value at his death of all
property transferred in his lifetime by a trust "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death." Spiegel's Estate v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Sup. Ct. 301 (1949) (6-3 decision). ,
This case is another in a series of cases extending the doctrine established
18. See I lirsch v. Conn'r, 115 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 7th 1940) ; Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42
B. T. A. 759 (1940) ; lelvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
19. 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 370 (1949). Even Mr. Justice Rutledge, who concurred with the
majority, thought ". . . that the result is essentially in conflict with that reached in Hel-
vering v. American Dental Co. . . ." Ibid.
